Privacy & data protection
STONKFUNBOT holds a wallet on your behalf, so this page is written to be specific rather than reassuring. It describes what is stored, how it is protected, who else sees it, and what we cannot protect you from.
Last updated 13 August 2026
There is no account, no email address, no password, and no personal profile. Using the bot means tweeting at it, so the only identifier involved is the public X handle that sent the tweet.
| Data | Why | Protection |
|---|---|---|
| Your X handle | Identifies which agent wallet is yours | Stored in plain text — it is already public, and it is how your wallet is found |
| Your agent wallet address | Receives your funding and is the creator address on chain | Public by nature; it is visible on Solana and in the bot's reply |
| Your agent wallet private key | Signs your launches | Encrypted at rest. Never logged, tweeted, returned by any API, or sent to a browser |
| Launch and fee records | Prevents paying twice; tracks the service fee and referral rebates | Owner-only files on the server |
| Handled tweet IDs | Stops the same command being executed more than once | Owner-only files on the server |
We never ask for and never store a seed phrase, a private key of yours, an exchange credential, or a password. If anything claiming to be STONKFUNBOT asks you for one, it is not us.
These are mechanisms in the running code, not aspirations.
Every agent wallet key is encrypted with a hybrid post-quantum scheme: ML-KEM-768 and X25519 key encapsulation, combined via HKDF into an AES-256-GCM key with per-row domain separation. The database stores ciphertext only. Older wallets using earlier schemes are transparently re-encrypted on first access.
The install’s long-term KEM keys are wrapped with a key derived from the master secret via scrypt and a random per-install salt. scrypt is memory-hard and deliberately slow, so a stolen database is expensive to attack offline rather than trivial.
It lives only in the server's environment. It is not in the code, not in the repository, and not in any database. Without it the stored wallets are meaningless ciphertext.
The data directory is created 0700 and every database
file 0600 — readable only by the account running the
bot, not by anything else sharing the host.
A key is only ever decrypted for the handle that owns it. No code path signs for one user in response to another user's command.
Before your wallet signs anything — a launch, a swap, or a withdraw — the transaction is decoded and rejected unless you are the fee payer, yours is the only signature required, and the SOL leaving your wallet is within a hard cap. A withdraw is checked most strictly of all: it must be exactly one transfer, to the address you confirmed, for the amount you confirmed, and nothing else.
Custody staying here does not trap your funds. From your hub you can send SOL out of your agent wallet to any address — you see the amount and destination and confirm before it is signed. Exporting the key still works too; withdrawing is the way out that needs neither.
Each launch is tied to the tweet that requested it, so a repeated or replayed command returns the original result instead of paying again.
Diagnostics print a redacted view of the configuration. Keys are not written to logs, error messages, or replies — a property checked by the test suite, not just by convention.
HttpOnly, so no script can read them, and neither is used
to profile you, count you, or follow you anywhere else.
We do not sell, rent, or share your data for marketing. It is not shared with anyone beyond what the product mechanically requires:
| Who | What reaches them |
|---|---|
| X (Twitter) | Your tweets and the bot's replies. Everything you send the bot is a public tweet, governed by X's own terms. |
| StonkFun | Your launch details and wallet address, when you launch — this is what creates the token. |
| The Solana network | Your transactions. Public and permanent by design; anyone can read them. |
| Our Solana RPC provider | Balance lookups and transactions submitted for your wallet. |
| Vercel | Hosts this website and standard server logs for it. |
Anything on a public blockchain or a public timeline is permanent and outside anyone's ability to delete — including ours.
Wallet records are kept for as long as the wallet may hold funds, because deleting the encrypted key would permanently destroy access to any SOL or tokens at that address. Fee records are kept as an accounting trail. Handled tweet IDs are pruned to a recent window.
To have your data removed, message @stonkfunbot on X. Move your funds out of the agent wallet first — once the key is deleted, anything left at that address is unrecoverable by anyone, including us.
Your agent wallet's key is held on our server. That is what lets the bot sign from a tweet, and there is no way around it in this design. Encryption protects that key at rest; it does not remove the fact that you are trusting the operator and the host. Fund the wallet with what a launch needs — it is not a place to store SOL.